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Project Summary
Firewalls are a key component for securing networks that are vital to government
agencies and private industry. They enforce a security policy by inspecting and ﬁlter-
ing traﬃc arriving or departing from a secure network [5, 40, 41]. While performing
these critical security operations, ﬁrewalls must act transparent to legitimate users,
with little or no eﬀect on the perceived network performance (QoS). Packets must be
inspected and compared against increasingly complex rule sets and tables, which is a
time-consuming process. As a result, current ﬁrewall systems can introduce signiﬁcant
delays and are unable to maintain QoS guarantees. Furthermore, ﬁrewalls are suscep-
tible to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks that merely overload/saturate the ﬁrewall with
illegitimate traﬃc [20, 27, 35, 39, 40]. Current ﬁrewall technology only oﬀers a short-
term solution that is not scalable; therefore, the objective of this DOE project
was to develop new firewall optimization techniques and architectures that
meet these important challenges.
Firewall optimization concerns decreasing the number of comparisons required per
packet, which reduces processing time and delay. This is done by reorganizing policy
rules via special sorting techniques that maintain the original policy integrity. This
research is important since it applies to current and future ﬁrewall systems. Another
method for increasing ﬁrewall performance is with new ﬁrewall designs. The architec-
tures under investigation consist of multiple ﬁrewalls that collectively enforce a security
policy. Our innovative distributed systems quickly divide traﬃc across diﬀerent levels
based on perceived threat, allowing traﬃc to be processed in parallel (beyond current
firewall sandwich technology). Traﬃc deemed safe is transmitted to the secure net-
work, while remaining traﬃc is forwarded to lower levels for further examination. The
result of this divide-and-conquer strategy is lower delays for legitimate traﬃc, higher
throughput, and traﬃc diﬀerentiation (a key component for maintaining QoS). Fur-
thermore, the distributed design is scalable to traﬃc loads and is less susceptible to DoS
attacks. Simulation and analytical results show these new architectures out-perform
any current ﬁrewall system, providing higher throughput, lower delays, and predictable
traﬃc diﬀerentiation.
3
1 List of Accomplishments
This project investigated several new and important research questions in network security.
Areas of interest included ﬁrewall policy optimization, parallel ﬁrewall system design, and
policy distribution methods. Given these diverse areas, the results of this research project
can beneﬁt current and future ﬁrewall systems. Relevant publications from this project are
cited after each area.
• Security Policy Models - Firewall policy representations are an integral part of
this project. Models must represent the policy integrity, while providing a means for
optimization. New models were developed by this project that utilize ordered sets,
tries, and directed graphs to achieve these objectives [18, 13].
• Security Policy Optimization - The order of ﬁrewall rules signiﬁcantly impacts
the security (integrity) and performance (processing time) of a security policy. Using
the policy models developed by this project, we have developed algorithms that can
optimize ﬁrewall security policies (reduce the number of comparisons required) [36, 13].
• Parallel Firewall Designs - Parallel ﬁrewall systems consist of an array of ﬁrewalls
that provide a scalable solution for securing high-speed networks. Two new function
parallel designs were developed by this project and have shown signiﬁcant performance
improvements. For example, simulation results and analytical models show an m-times
reduction in processing delay is possible using the new function parallel designs as
compared to current data parallel designs [12, 14, 15].
• Security Policy Distribution - Given an array of ﬁrewalls, rules must be distributed
such that the integrity of the original policy is maintained (parallel ﬁrewall and single
ﬁrewall arrive at the same decision for the same packet). Using the policy Directed
Acyclical Graph (DAG) model developed by this project, we have established certain
criteria that must be followed to maintain integrity in parallel-ﬁrewall architectures
[16].
• Parallel Intrusion Detection Systems - Many of parallel designs can be applied to
Intrusion Dection Systems (IDS), thereby reducing the latency associated with payload
packet inspections. This project conducted an initial survey of parallel IDS techniques
[37].
• Open-Source Implementation and Synergistic Activities - We have imple-
mented the function parallel ﬁrewall architecture using Linux PC’s that can provide a
low-cost, scalable, high-speed ﬁrewall system. This work has also resulted in two pro-
visional patents for high-speed security devices, the creation of a company GreatWall
Systems (co-founded by the PI), and the funding of Phase I and II STTR proposals
(GreatWall Systems and Wake Forest University). In addition a collaborative eﬀort
has started between this project and DOE Paciﬁc Northwest National Laboratories
(PNNL) that will integrate high-speed security techniques into their infrastructure.
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1.1 Students Supported
This research project supported the following students, each associated with the Computer
Science Department at Wake Forest University.
• Stephen Tarsa, undergraduate researcher, results published in the 2005 IEEE IM [13]
and IEEE ISCC [18, 36]. Research has resulted in a patent pending.
• Ryan J. Farley, MS thesis: “Function-Parallel Firewalls for High-Speed Networks,”
completed in 2006. Results published in IEEE ICC 2006 [15], IASTED Parallel Com-
puting and Networking Conference [12] completed in 2005. Research has resulted in a
patent pending.
• Micheal Horvath, MS thesis ”Policy Management Methods for Function Parallel Fire-
walls,” completed in 2007. Results published in the SPIE High Capacity Optical Net-
works and Enabling Technologies [16].
1.2 Publications and Invited Presentations
This research project has yielded multiple publications and presentations at various ACM/IEEE
conferences and workshops. The focus of these publications include: policy optimiza-
tion/managment (a new area discovered by this project), parallel ﬁrewalls, and parallel
IDS.
Refereed publications
• Errin Fulp and Patrick Wheeler. A Taxonomy of Parallel Techniques for Intrusion
Detection. In Proceedings of the ACMSE, Special Session on Computer and Network
Security, 2007.
• Errin W. Fulp. An Independent Function-Parallel Firewall Architecture for High-
Speed Networks (Short Paper). In Proceedings of the International Conference on
Information and Communications Security, 2006.
• Errin W. Fulp, Micheal R. Horvath, and Christopher C. Kopek. Managing Security
Policies for High-Speed Function Parallel Firewalls. In Proceedings of the SPIE In-
ternational Symposium on High Capacity Optical Networks and Enabling Technology,
2006.
• Errin W. Fulp. Parallel Firewall Designs for High-Speed Firewalls. In Proceedings of
the IEEE INFOCOM, High-Speed Networking Workshop, 2006.
• Stephen J. Tarsa and Errin W. Fulp. Balancing Trie-Based Policy Representations for
Network Firewalls. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Symposium on Computer
Communications (ISCC’06), 2006.
• Errin W. Fulp and Ryan J. Farley. A Function-Parallel Architecture for High-Speed
Firewalls. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Communications,
2006.
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• Ryan J. Farley and Errin W. Fulp. Eﬀects of Processing Delay on Function-Parallel
Network Firewalls. In Proceedings of the IASTED International Conference on Parallel
and Distributed Computing and Networks, 2006.
• Errin W. Fulp and Stephen J. Tarsa. Trie-Based Policy Representations for Network
Firewalls. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Symposium on Computer Com-
munications (ISCC’05), 2005.
• Errin W. Fulp. Optimization of Network Firewall Policies Using Directed Acyclical
Graphs. In Proceedings of the IEEE Internet Management Conference (IM’05), 2005.
Invited presentations
• Errin W. Fulp. Improving the Performance of Firewalls and Intrusion Protection Sys-
tems for High-Speed Networks, 2006. Department of Computer Science Seminar, North
Carolina State University.
• Errin W. Fulp. Techniques for Improving the Performance of Signature-Based Net-
work IDS, 2006. DOE Paciﬁc Northwest National Laboratory, Cyber Security Group
Seminar.
• Errin W. Fulp. Security Issues for the Next Generation of Networks, 2005. Department
of Computer Science Seminar, Old Dominion University.
• Errin W. Fulp. Advances in Firewall Architectures for High-Speed Networks, 2005.
DOE High-Performance Network Research Meeting, DOE Brookhaven National Lab-
oratory.
• Errin W. Fulp. Firewall and Intrusion Detection Systems for High-Speed Networks,
2005. DOE Paciﬁc Northwest National Laboratory, Cyber Security Group Seminar.
• Errin W. Fulp. Firewall Optimization Techniques and Architectures for High-Speed
Networks, 2004. DOE Paciﬁc Northwest National Laboratory, Cyber Security Group
Seminar.
• Errin W. Fulp. Firewall Architectures for High-Speed Networks, 2004. DOE High-
Performance Network Research Meeting, DOE Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory.
1.3 Synergistic Activities
This project has started several important synergistic activities, these includes a new com-
pany and collaborations with several national research laboratories. In collaboration with
the Wake Forest University Oﬃce of Technology Management, the following two preliminary
patents ﬁlled for policy optimization and parallel ﬁrewall architectures.
• “Computer Network with Function-Parallel Firewall,” Errin W. Fulp and Ryan J.
Farley. U.S. Patent Pending No. 60/638,436 May 2005
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• “Methods and Systems for Firewall Policy Optimization,” Errin W. Fulp and Stephen
J. Tarsa. U.S. Patent Pending No. 60/655,664 May 2005
Based on promising experimental results, the Oﬃce of Technology Asset Management has
started a business, GreatWall Systems located in Winston-Salem NC. The business will oﬀer
computer/network security solutions that are based on this research. To date, GreatWall
Systems has receive both public (DOE STTR Phase I and II) and private funding.
Other synergistic activities started during this research project include the following.
• Founded the Network Security Group(nsg.cs.wfu.edu) at Wake Forest University, an
inter-campus collaboration to discuss current security issues.
• Program Committee for the IEEE INFOCOM High-Speed Networks Workshop, 2007.
• Established the Research and Education Collaboration Initiative between Wake For-
est University and PNNL Cyber Security Group that supports security research and
education.
• Program Committee and Local Arrangements Chair for the 2006 Eighth International
Conference on Information and Communications Security.
• Co-Chair for the Special Session on Computer Security, ACMSE, 2007.
2 Project Motivation
Network ﬁrewalls remain the forefront defense for most computer systems. Guided by a
security policy, these devices provide access control, auditing, and traﬃc control [5, 40, 41].
As seen in table 1, a security policy is a set of ordered rules that deﬁne the action to perform
on matching packets. Given the packet and/or connection information, rules indicate the
action to take place for each packet, such as discard, forward, or redirect. Security can be
further enhanced with connection state information. For example a table can be used to
record the state of each connection, which is useful for preventing certain types of attacks
(e.g., TCP SYN ﬂood) [41].
Traditional ﬁrewall implementations consist of a single dedicated machine, similar to a
router, that sequentially applies the rule set to each arriving packet. However, packet ﬁltering
can represent a signiﬁcantly higher processing load than routing decisions [29, 35, 41]. For
example, a ﬁrewall that interconnects two 100 Mbps networks would have to process over
300,000 packets per second [40]. Successfully handling this high traﬃc becomes more diﬃcult
as rule sets become more complex [6, 27, 41]. Furthermore, ﬁrewalls must be capable of
processing even more packets as interface speeds increase. In a high-speed environment
(e.g. Gigabit Ethernet), a single ﬁrewall can easily become a bottleneck and is susceptible
to DoS attacks [6, 11, 19, 20]. An attacker could simply inundate the ﬁrewall with traﬃc,
delaying or preventing legitimate packets from being processed. Therefore, new network
ﬁrewall solutions are necessary to manage these security threats.
This project investigated two methods for improving the performance of network ﬁrewalls.
The ﬁrst method involves the representation and rule reorganization of the ﬁrewall policy.
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Source Destination
No. Proto. IP Port IP Port Action Prob.
1 TCP 140.* * 130.* 80 deny 0.1
2 TCP 140.* * * 80 accept 0.05
3 TCP 150.* * 120.* 90 accept 0.15
4 UDP 150.* * * 3030 accept 0.3
5 * * * * * deny 0.4
Table 1: Example security policy consisting of multiple ordered rules.
These techniques seek to reduce the number of operations required to determine the correct
action for an arriving packet. Although these techniques can improve the performance and is
applicable to current ﬁrewalls, the performance improvement is limited. The second approach
uses parallel ﬁrewalls to provide scalable performance improvements. Both approaches and
the associated research ﬁndings are described in the following sections.
3 Security Policy Models
A ﬁrewall rule set, also known as a ﬁrewall policy or Access Control List (ACL), is tradi-
tionally an ordered list of ﬁrewall rules. Firewall policy models have been the subject of
recent research [2, 3, 22]; however, the primary purpose is anomaly detection and policy
veriﬁcation. In contrast, the policy model developed by this project was designed for ﬁrewall
performance optimization and integrity. Firewall performance refers to reducing the average
number of comparisons required to determine an action, while integrity refers to maintaining
the original policy intent.
3.1 Firewall Rule and Policy Models
A ﬁrewall rule r can be modeled as an ordered tuple of sets, r = (r[1], r[2], ..., r[k]). Order
is necessary among the tuples since comparing rules and packets requires the comparison of
corresponding tuples. Each tuple r[l] is a set that can be fully speciﬁed, specify a range,
or contain wildcards ‘*’ in standard preﬁx format. For the Internet, security rules are
commonly represented as a 5-tuple consisting of: protocol type, IP source address, source
port number, IP destination address, and destination port number [40, 41]. Given this
model, the ordered tuples can be supersets and subsets of each other, which forms the basis
of precedence relationships. In addition to the preﬁxes, each ﬁlter rule has an action, which
is to accept or deny. However, the action will not be considered when comparing packets
and rules. Similar to a rule, a packet (IP datagram) d can be viewed as an ordered k-tuple
d = (d[1], d[2], ..., d[k]); however, ranges and wildcards are not possible for any packet tuple.
Using the previous rule deﬁnition, a standard security policy can be modeled as an
ordered set (list) of n rules, denoted as R = {r1, r2, ..., rn}. A packet d is sequentially
compared against each rule ri starting with the ﬁrst, until a match is found (d ⇒ ri)
then the associated action is performed. This is referred to as a first-match policy and is
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generally the default behavior for the majority of ﬁrewall systems including the Linux ﬁrewall
implementation iptables [30]. For this project we assume a ﬁrst-match evaluation is always
used. A match is found between a packet and rule when every tuple of the packet is a subset
of the corresponding tuple in the rule.
Definition Packet d matches ri if
d ⇒ ri iﬀ d[l] ⊆ ri[l], l = 1, ..., k
3.1.1 Policy Accept and Deny Sets
Given a ﬁrewall security policy and a ﬁrst-match evaluation, it is important to determine
the packets that will be accepted, denied, or not match any rule. Assume a policy R exists
and ﬁrst-match evaluation is used. Let A be the set of packets that will be accepted, let D
be the set of packets that will be denied, and let U be the set of packets that do not match
any rule. If the set of all possible packets is C, then a policy R is comprehensive if U = ∅
(i.e. A ∪D = C). Therefore, policy R is comprehensive if for every possible packet a match
is found, which is an important objective.
There are many diﬀerent ways to implement a given policy (e.g. using a single or paral-
lel ﬁrewall) or even modify it (e.g. reorder, combine, add, or remove rules); therefore, it is
important to determine equivalence and policy integrity. Consider two comprehensive poli-
cies R and R′ that have accept sets A and A′ respectively. The two policies are considered
equivalent if A = A′. Therefore, if policy R is replaced by an equivalent policy R′ then
the integrity of R is maintained. Therefore, it is important to maintain the precedence
constraints when implementing a ﬁrewall security policy.
3.2 Modeling Rule List Precedence Relationships
Because of the ﬁrst-match evaluation, a rule list has an implied precedence relationship where
certain rules must appear before others if the integrity of the policy is to be maintained. For
example consider the rule list in table 1. Rule r1 must appear before rule r2, likewise rule
r5 must be the last rule in the policy. If for example, rule r2 was moved to the beginning
of the policy, then it will shadow [3] the original rule r1. However, there is no precedence
relationship between rules r2 and r3 given in table 1. Therefore, the relative ordering of these
two rules will not impact the policy integrity and can be changed to improve performance.
Performance refers to the number of rule comparisons required to ﬁnd the ﬁrst match for
a given policy and packet. We will assume the original policy is free from any anomalies.
When a policy is reordered to improve performance it should not introduce any anomalies,
which will occur if precedence relationships are not maintained. As a result, a model is
needed to eﬀectively represent precedence relationships.
This project developed a new model for the rule precedence relationships using a Directed
Acyclical Graph (DAG) [28, 23]. Such graphs have been successfully used to represent the
relative order of individual tasks that must take place to complete a job (referred to as a task
graph model). Since certain rules must appear before others to maintain policy integrity,
this structure is well suited for modeling the precedence of ﬁrewall rules.
9
Let G = (R,E) be a policy DAG for a policy R, where vertices are rules and edges E are
the precedence relationships (constraint). A precedence relationship, or edge, exists between
rules ri and rj, if i < j, the actions for each rule are diﬀerent, and the rules intersect.
Definition The intersection of rule ri and rj , denoted as ri ∩ rj is
ri ∩ rj = (ri[l] ∩ rj[l]), l = 1, ..., k
Therefore, the intersection of two rules results in an ordered set of tuples that collectively
describes the packets that match both rules. The rules ri and rj intersect if every tuple
of the resulting operation is non-empty. In contrast, the rules ri and rj do not intersect,
denoted as ri /∩ rj , if at least one tuple is the empty set. Note the intersection operation is
symmetric; therefore, if ri intersects rj, then rj will intersect ri. The same is true for rules
that do not intersect.
For example consider the rules given in table 1, the intersection of r1 and r2 yields (TCP,
140.*, *, 130.*, 80). Again, the rule actions are not considered in the intersection or
match operation. Since these two rules intersect, a packet can match both rules for example
d = (TCP, 140.1.1.1, 80, 130.1.1.1, 80). Furthermore, the actions of the two rules
are diﬀerent. Therefore, the relative order must be maintained between these two rules
and an edge drawn from r1 to r2 must be present in the policy DAG, as seen in ﬁgure
1(a). In contrast consider the intersection of rules r1 and r5. These two rules intersect,
indicating packets belonging to the set (TCP, 140.*, *, 130.*, 80) would match both
rules. However, it does not matter which of the two rules a packet matches ﬁrst, since the
action is the same for both rules. Therefore, an edge does not exist between rules r1 and r5
in the diagram. Similarly, rules r2 and r3 do not intersect due to the second tuple (source
IP address). A packet cannot match both rules indicating the relative order can change;
therefore, an edge will not exist between them.
The match operation can be used to identify precedence relationships, but it cannot do
so in every case. Consider a partial-match example [2], where ra = (UDP, *, 80, 10.*,
90, accept) and rb = (UDP, 10.*, 80, *, 90, deny). The intersection of ra and rb is
(UDP, 10.*, 80, 10.*, 90); therefore a packet, such as d = (UDP, 10.10.10.10, 80,
10.10.10.10, 90), can match both rules. If ra appears before rb then the packet d is
accepted, but if rb occurs before ra then d is rejected. As a result, the order of ra and rb in
the original policy must be maintained. However, the match operation is unable to identify
the precedence in this example.
Using the policy DAG representation a linear arrangement is sought that improves the
ﬁrewall performance. As depicted in ﬁgure 1(b), a linear arrangement (permutation or
topological sort) is a list of DAG vertices where all the successors of a vertex appear in
sequence after that vertex [28]. Therefore it follows that a linear arrangement of a policy
DAG represents a rule order, if the vertices are read from left to right. Furthermore, it is
proven in theorem 3.1 that any linear arrangement of a policy DAG maintains integrity.
Theorem 3.1 Any linear arrangement of a policy DAG maintains integrity.
Proof Assume a policy DAG G is constructed from the security policy R that is free of
anomalies. Consider any two rules ri and rj in the policy, where i < j. If an edge between
10
r1 r2 r3
r4 r5
(a) Policy DAG.
r1 r2 r3 r4 r5
(b) Linear arrangement corresponding
to the original rule order.
Figure 1: Rule list DAG representations of the ﬁrewall rules given in table 1. Vertices are rules
(circle is an accept rule and square is a deny rule) while edges indicate precedence requirements.
ri and rj in G does not exist, then a linear arrangement of G can interchange the order of
the two rules. An edge will not exist if the rules do not intersect; however, a reorder will not
eﬀect integrity since a packet cannot match both rules. Shadowing is not introduced due to
the reorder since the intersection operation is symmetric. An edge will not exist if the two
rules intersect but have the same action; however, a reorder will not eﬀect integrity since
the same action will occur regardless of which rule is matched ﬁrst. If an edge does exist
between the rules, then their relative order will be maintained in every linear arrangement
of G; thus maintaining precedence and integrity.
3.3 Trie-Based Policy Representation
The previous sections described a model that represents the ﬁrewall policy in a list form,
which can be implemented using a simple list data structure. However, non-linear data struc-
tures can also be used to represent the ﬁrewall policy that can provide several performance
beneﬁts.
This project developed a new security policy representation called the policy trie, which
provides faster processing of packets while maintaining the integrity of the original policy.
The policy trie T is a n-ary trie structure consisting of k levels that stores a security policy.
Each level T [l] corresponds to a rule tuple (except for the root), while nodes on a certain
level store the tuple values T [l, v]. Unlike the standard binary trie structure [1], the policy
trie is unique since a node can have multiple children, similar to an n-ary tree. This is
required since a node will store a rule tuple (multibit ﬁeld), not just a single bit as done in
[34]. Tuples at each level are organized from speciﬁc to general (reading left to right). For
reference, levels will be numbered sequentially starting with zero for the root node. Likewise,
nodes of a particular level will be numbered sequentially starting with zero for the left-most
node. Since each level stores a tuple, a path from the root node to a leaf represents a ﬁrewall
rule, as seen in ﬁgure 2.
To create a policy trie T , rules are added in the order they appear in R. A rule r is
added to T by starting with the root node on the ﬁrst level and comparing the values of its
children with the corresponding tuple of r. If one of the children is equal (not just a subset)
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root
TCP UDP * protocol
140.* 150.* 150.* * source IP
* * * * source port
130.* * 120.* * * destination IP
20 80 90 3030 * destination port
deny accept accept accept deny action
r1 r2 r3 r4 r5
Figure 2: Policy trie representation of the ﬁrewall rules given in table 1.
to the corresponding rule tuple, then r will share this node and a new node is not added for
this level. The trie is traversed to that node and the process of comparing children to the
rule is repeated using the next tuple in r. If an exact match does not exist, a new child node
is created that contains the value of the corresponding packet tuple. In order to maintain
the speciﬁc-to-general organization of the trie, the new node is inserted in the rightmost
available position such that it is before (to the left of) any sibling that is a superset of the
new node. The new node forms a chain of nodes that stores the remaining tuple values of
the rule.
Consider the events that occur when rule r2 is added to the trie given in ﬁgure 2. Rule r2
has the same protocol, IP source, and source port values as r1; therefore, r2 will share these
nodes. Since the destination IP is diﬀerent, this forms a chain consisting of this tuple, the
destination port, and action. This chain connects to the source port node, which adds r2 to
the trie. It is this structure that allows the elimination of multiple rules simultaneously. For
example if a UDP packet is compared using the trie given in ﬁgure 2, then rules r1, r2, and
r3 are eliminated after the protocol tuple comparison.
Once the new rule is added, if any nodes exist to the right of the new rule, then this
represents a rule re-order and may result in a shadowing. The intersection of the new rule
and each of these right-most rules is taken and the action of right rule, the rule that appears
ﬁrst in the ordered policy, is applied.
Definition The intersection of rule ri and rj , denoted as ri ∩ rj is
ri ∩ rj = (ri[l] ∩ rj[l]), l = 1, ..., k
For all intersections that yield valid rules, the results form a subtree of the newly added
rule. The same method is applied to this subtree. For example consider the rules given in
ﬁgure 3(a). Note that the relative order of the rules must be preserved; otherwise integrity
is not maintained. When r2 is added to the policy trie, the source IP address will cause
the rule to be placed before r1 and the intersection must be taken. The intersection of r1
and r2 is (UDP, 1.*, 80, 1.*, 90). The result of the intersection indicates a packet can
12
Source Destination
No. Proto. IP Port IP Port Action
1 UDP * 80 1.* 90 deny
2 UDP 1.* 80 * 90 accept
3 * * * * * deny
(a) Example rule list, where the rules must maintain
their relative order.
root
UDP *
1.* * *
80 80 *
1.* * 1.* *
90 90 90 *
deny accept deny deny
r1 ∩ r2 r2 r1 r3
(b) Policy trie that requires intersection of r1 and
r2.
Figure 3: List and trie representation of a security policy where the policy trie requires the
intersection operation to maintain the integrity of the list.
match both rules, for example d = (UDP, 1.1.1.1, 80, 1.1.1.1, 90). Therefore this
intersection rule, with the action of r1, must be added to the trie. The ﬁnal policy trie is
given in ﬁgure 3(b), which maintains the integrity of the policy given in 3(a). When r3 is
added, it is located to the right of r1 and r2, thus intersections are not performed. In this
example rules r1 and r2 are considered a partial-match [3]. The DAG policy representation
described in [10] will not correctly represent partial-match rules, because subsets (as done
with the match operation) are used to create the structure instead of intersections. As a
result, the DAG structure described in [10] is not suitable for ﬁrewall policies since integrity
cannot be maintained.
To process a packet d using the policy trie T (also referred to as searching T ), the corre-
sponding tuple of the packet is compared with the children of the root node. Comparisons of
nodes are always performed from left and right, or speciﬁc to general. Once a match is found,
the current node is marked and the trie is traversed to the matching child. The procedure
is repeated with the remaining rule tuples. If no match is found, the search backtracks to
the parent node and ﬁnds the next matching node that has not been visited, continuing the
process of left to right comparison. Once a path has been found from the root node to a leaf
where all the rule tuples match (p[l] ⊆ T [l, i], l = 1, ..., k) the associated action is performed.
3.3.1 Policy Trie Integrity
As previously stated, a necessary objective of any policy representation is its ability to
maintain the policy integrity. This occurs if the new representation is equivalent to the
original list-based policy. A policy trie T is equivalent to the original security policy R for
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any legal packet d, if searches of T and R result in the same action being performed. Unlike
other representations, this is proven true in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2 A policy trie T is equivalent to the original security policy R.
Proof Assume a trie T is constructed with k levels using the process previously described
from an n rule security policy (ordered list). Furthermore assume the completed trie is
searched using the previously described method. One of the following three cases will occur
during the creation of the trie.
Case 1 Rule reorder does not occur during creation. If rule reorders do not occur during the
creation of T , then rules will appear from left to right in T as they appear in R (an in-order
traversal of T yields R). As a result, the policy representations are equivalent because nodes
are tested from left to right.
Case 2 Rule reorders occur without intersections. Consider a trie T consisting of n−1 rules
from R, which are added using the process previously described. In addition, let the n− 1
rules be ordered in T as they are in R. Assume a new rule rn is added to T and is located to
the left of an existing rule rm. Let S be the set of rules that appear to the right of rn in T ,
S = {ri, m ≤ i ≤ n}. If the rules in S do not intersect with rn, then a packet cannot match
both rn and any rule in S. As a result, testing rn before any rule in S is not signiﬁcant since
shadowing is not introduced; thus, the reorder does not eﬀect policy integrity.
Case 3 Reorder and intersections occur during creation. Consider a trie T consisting of
n− 1 rules from R, which are added using the process previously described. In addition, let
the n− 1 rules be ordered in T as they are in R. Assume a new rule rn is added to T and is
located to the left of the existing rule rm. Let S be the set of rules that appear to right of
rn in T , S = {ri, m ≤ i ≤ n}. Assume rn does intersect with rule ri in S. The intersection
represents the set of packets that match rn and ri, where the tuples of the intersection are
the more speciﬁc of the two rules. There must be at least one tuple in ri more speciﬁc
than the corresponding tuple in rn, otherwise rn is shadowed in the original rule list. The
intersection rule will be located to the left of rn and have the action of the ri. Therefore, the
intersection rule will always be tested ﬁrst, and if true the action of the rule ri is applied.
This is the correct response; therefore, the reorder will not aﬀect integrity.
3.3.2 Push-Down Policy Tries
The policy trie as described thus far may require backtracking when a packet is processed
(search is performed). Backtracking searches can have a worst-case performance that is equal
to a list representation [29]. Although the penalty for backtracking in an n-ary trie is not
as severe as a standard binary version, the conversion to a non-backtracking trie can reduce
the number of tuple-compares, which is the objective of the representation.
A non-backtracking policy trie, referred to as a push-down policy trie, is created by
replicating, or pushing-down general rules in the original policy. A general rule is a superset
of at least one other rule in the policy, and is deﬁned as a range of values, containing at least
one wild-card in the standard preﬁx notation. The push-down procedure replicates more
general rules in subset subtries, that would match the same packets as the general rule. As
a result, the union of the push-down rules is a proper subset of the original rule.
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Figure 4: Push-down policy trie representation of the ﬁrewall rules given in table 1.
Definition The push-down of rule rg to rs, denoted as rg ↓ rs is
rg ↓ rs = (rs[1, .., l], rg[(l + 1), ..., k], rg[action])
where the rg[i] = rs[i], i = 1, ..., (l − 1) and l is the index of the ﬁrst tuple of rs that is a
subset of the corresponding tuple in rg.
A general rule can only be pushed-down to rules that appear to left of it in the trie.
Furthermore, a non-backtracking policy trie is created when all general rules are pushed-
down; therefore, rg ↓ rs, ∀s < g. This can be easily implemented using a post-order traversal
of the policy trie. Note that while push-down always creates a rule that is more speciﬁc than
the general rule being pushed, the resulting rule may still be a superset of other rules in the
policy trie, and thus must be pushed down. For example, consider the push-down policy trie
given in ﬁgure 4. When rule r5 is pushed-down to rule r1 it creates rule r6. This is a general
rule that is pushed-down again to rule r1 yielding r7. This process repeats yielding r8, which
cannot be pushed-down further.
As done with the original (backtracking) policy trie, we must be certain that the integrity
of the original policy is maintained when using a push-down policy trie. Theorem 3.3 proves
that push-down and original policy tries are equivalent. Therefore it can be stated that the
push-down policy trie maintains integrity since, the original policy trie was proven to do so
in theorem 3.2.
Theorem 3.3 A push-down policy trie Tp is equivalent to the original policy trie T , which
is equivalent to the original security policy R.
Proof Assume a push-down trie Tp is constructed with k levels from an n rule ordered list.
Consider node i on level l, Tp[l, i], that is part of rule rs. The children of node i include
the children of siblings (of node i) that appear to the right, if node i matches the sibling.
Recall the push-down procedure is recursive. If a tuple value is not present among the
children of node i, the associated rule(s) are not a possible alternative since node i is not a
match. Furthermore, given the procedure for constructing the push-down trie, the children
are always ordered as they appear on the right. The rules will be tested in Tp in the same
order as T which is equivalent to R.
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3.3.3 Worst Case Analysis
As described in the previous section, the push-down policy trie oﬀers a performance increase
by eliminating the need to traverse backwards. In this section, the worst case performance
and storage requirement of the push-down trie is analyzed theoretically. A primary objective
of the policy trie representation is to reduce the number of tuple-comparisons required per
packet. Before this can be done, two important lemmas about push-down policy tries are
required. The associated proofs have been omitted due to space constraints [17].
Lemma 3.4 A node in a push-down policy trie cannot have more than n (the number of
rules) children.
Lemma 3.5 Each node traversal at a particular level in a push-down policy trie eliminates
at least one rule from consideration.
The previous two lemmas provide important bounds on the structure of any push-down
policy trie. As a result, the worst case number of tuple-comparisons is O(n + k), which is
proven in theorem 3.6. Comparing this bound with the worst case for a list-based represen-
tation, the push-down policy trie requires a fraction (1/k) of the processing.
Theorem 3.6 A comprehensive push-down trie consisting of k levels and constructed from
n rules requires O(n+ k) number of tuple-comparisons to match a packet in the worst case.
Proof We must always traverse every level of the trie (k tuple-compares) to determine the
action. Following from lemmas 3.4 and 3.5, we know that traversing a node eliminates at
least one rule, which would require n traversals in the worst case. As a result, the worst case
number of tuple-compares is k + n.
It is important to note that intersection and push-down operations do increase the number
of nodes in the push-down trie, which increases the storage requirement. This is evident in
the number of nodes required for the push-down trie depicted in ﬁgure 4 as compared to
the original trie given in ﬁgure 2. Given an n rule ﬁrewall policy, push-down causes the
worst case storage requirement to occur under two speciﬁc conditions. The ﬁrst condition is
ri ⇒ rj, ∀i < j < n, a rule matches all the rules that appear to the right, maximizing the
number of push-downs that occur. The second condition is ri[l] 
= rj[l], ∀i < j < n, 1 ≤ l ≤ k;
none of the tuples are equal and nodes are never shared. This worst case is depicted in ﬁgure
5(a), where a 3 rule list requires 20 nodes in the push-down policy trie. However, the number
of nodes required by the trie can be greatly reduced by converting it into a Directed Acycical
Graph (DAG) [1, 29]. In the context of a DAG, the push-down operation directly references
nodes instead of replicating them as in the policy trie. For example, consider the push-
down trie given in ﬁgure 4. The parents of the nodes labeled A and B could point to the
node labeled C, which eliminates the need for new nodes for rules r6 and r11. The other
push-down rules can be replaced in a similar fashion. Similarly, the DAG equivalent of the
push-down policy trie given in ﬁgure 5(a) is depicted in ﬁgure 5(b) and requires signiﬁcantly
fewer nodes. The DAG conversion causes the worst case push-down trie to only require k ·n
tuples, which equals the storage requirement for a list representation.
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(a) Worst case push-down policy trie. Double
circle nodes are the result of push-down opera-
tions.
root
r1 r2 r3
(b) DAG representation. The dotted arrows re-
place the push-down nodes.
Figure 5: Worst case push-down policy trie (r1 ⇒ r2, r1 ⇒ r3, and r2 ⇒ r3) and the DAG
equivalent. Assume the original security policy has three rules, where a rule has only three tuples.
The intersection of two rules, required when rule reordering occurs, may also result in a
new rule (a new combination of existing tuples). The worst case policy would require the
intersection among all rules to result in a valid rule, where tuples of the new rule alternate
between the two rules. In addition, the rules would have to be listed according to the ﬁrst
tuple from most general to most speciﬁc. In this situation, intersection operations result in
chains. Therefore, the worst case number of nodes required to store the policy trie would be
O(n2). Although this is a higher space requirement than the standard list representation, it
only occurs under very speciﬁc circumstances. Furthermore, the signiﬁcance of the additional
space requirement is relative to the frequency of the worst case packet(s).
3.3.4 Experimental Results
The previous section described a new network security policy representation called a policy
trie that was shown to provide theoretically better performance than the standard list-
based representation. Simulation results presented in this section will conﬁrm the worst case
number of tuple-comparisons and show that similar performance gains are achieved in the
average case. In addition, the average and worst case storage requirements for the diﬀerent
policy representations are presented and will be shown to also remain within their theoretical
bounds.
Simulations were conducted using list, backtracking trie (original trie), and push-down
trie representations of ﬁrewall policies. A random rule generator was used to create valid
rule sets with a realistic degree of rule intersection. The generator was set to allow a slightly
lower number of tuple permutations at high levels (source, source port, etc.) so that the
shape of resulting policy tries would mirror those of real-world ﬁrewall rule sets. Policy sizes
ranged from 50 rules to 500 rules, where 50 diﬀerent policies were generated per policy size.
Sets of 10,000 packets were passed through representations of each policy and the resulting
decisions made were validated against the original rule set. Statistics concerning the average
and worst case number of tuple-comparisons were recorded as well as the amount of storage
required for each policy representation
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Figure 6: The average and worst case number of tuple-comparisons required for the ﬁrewall
experiments. Push-down trie provided the best performance in both cases.
3.3.5 Tuple-Comparisons Results
Results for the tuple-comparisons are given in ﬁgure 6. As expected, when the policy sizes
increased, both trie representations always performed considerably better than the linear
rule set. In all cases, each representation reached the same decision, indicating that they
were equivalent; thus maintaining integrity. As seen in ﬁgure 6(a), the average performance
for backtracking tries appears to be similar to that of push-down tries. However, the back-
tracking trie required 5 times as many comparisons on average than the push-down trie,
while the original list required 34 times as many tuple-comparisons on average.
The variance for the average number of comparisons in push-down tries was slightly lower
than that of backtracking tries. As a result, push-down tries sometimes performed signif-
icantly better than their backtracking counterparts. Compared to linear implementations,
the variance of trie-based implementations was very low and relatively constant. The stan-
dard deviation of the average number of comparisons in either trie implementation never
rose above 20 per packet over 10,000 packets. Though this number may seem signiﬁcant,
the variance of linear policies averaged more than 46 comparisons and sometimes ranged as
high as 100 comparisons.
The worst case number of tuple-comparisons required by each representation is given
in ﬁgure 6(b). Similar to the average case results, both trie representations out-performed
the list representation. Compared to the push-down trie the backtracking trie required 7
times as many of tuple-comparisons to reach a decision in the worst case, while the list
representation required 31 times as many. In addition, the performance of push-down tries
and list representations were within the theoretical bounds.
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Figure 7: The average and worst case number of tuple stored for the ﬁrewall experiments.
Backtracking trie required the least amount of storage in both cases.
3.4 Storage Results
The amount of storage required, measured in the number of tuples, is depicted in ﬁgure
7. As predicted, when policy sizes increased the backtracking tries consistently used less (a
third for these experiments) of the storage required by the list representation. In contrast,
the push-down tries required the most storage. The push-down trie storage was nonlinear
with respect to the number of rules and on average required 10 times as much storage as the
backtracking trie. Furthermore, the variance of push-down tries averaged over 1,000 nodes,
while the variance of backtracking tries averaged less than 50 nodes. Although the push-
down trie representation required the most storage, the observed worst case requirement was
well below the theoretical upper bound of n2, requiring on average 92% fewer tuples.
The amount of storage required by both trie representations is directly related to the
degree of rule overlap. Backtracking tries beneﬁt from rule overlap because overlap results
in a greater number of shared nodes. In contrast, the storage requirement for push-down tries
improves when there are fewer subset relations in a policy, since fewer push-down operations
occur.
4 Security Policy Optimization Techniques
An important research area during the ﬁrst year was the development of the ﬁrewall policy
models: policy Directed Acyclical Graphs (DAG) and policy tries. These models were de-
signed to maintain policy integrity and have been key for directing ﬁrewall design (such as
topology). Security policy optimization is the reorganization of ﬁrewall rules to reduce the
search time required to ﬁnd the appropriate match (average or worst case). How optimization
is performed depends on the data structure used to represent the policy.
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4.1 List-Based Policy Optimization
As mentioned in the introduction, it is important to inspect packets as quickly as possible
given increasing network speeds and QoS requirements. Using the policy DAG to main-
tain policy integrity, a linear arrangement is sought that minimizes the average number of
comparisons required. However, this will require information not present in the ﬁrewall rule
list. Certain ﬁrewall rules have a higher probability of matching a packet than others. As
a result, it is possible to develop a policy profile over time that indicates frequency of rule
matches (similar to cache hit ratio). Let P = {p1, p2, ..., pn} be the policy proﬁle, where pi
is the probability that a packet will match rule i (ﬁrst match in the policy). Furthermore,
assume a packet will always ﬁnd a match,
∑n
i=1 pi = 1; therefore R is comprehensive. Using
this information, the average number of rule comparisons required is
E[n] =
n∑
i=1
i · pi (1)
For example, the average number of comparisons required for the rule set in table 1 is 3.85.
Given a policy DAG G = (R,E) and policy proﬁle P = {p1, p2, ..., pn} a linear arrange-
ment π of G is sought that minimizes equation 1. In the absence of precedence relationships,
the average number of comparisons is minimized if the rules are sorted in non-increasing
order according to the probabilities [31], which is also referred to as Smith’s algorithm [33].
Precedence constraints causes the problem to be more realistic; however, it also makes de-
termining the optimal permutation more problematic.
Determining the optimal rule list permutation can be viewed as job scheduling for a single
machine with precedence constraints [21, 26]. The notation for such scheduling problems is
α|β|γ|δ, where α is the number of machines, β is the precedence (or absence of) which can be
represented as a DAG, γ is a restriction on processing time, and δ is the optimality criterion
[21]. Determining the optimal rule order is similar to the 1|β|1|∑wiCi scheduling problem,
or optimality criterion, where wi is a weight associated with a job (for example, importance)
and Ci is the completion time. As previously noted, the 1|||
∑
wiCi problem can be solved in
linear time the using Smith’s algorithm [33], which orders jobs according to non-decreasing
ti
wi
ratio, where ti is the processing time of job i. In this case set ti = 1 and wi = pi ∀i.
However, Lawler [24] and Lenstra et. al. [26] proved 1|β|1|∑wiCi to be NP-hard via the
linear arrangement problem, which implies determining the optimal ﬁrewall rule order is also
NP-hard. Note, determining the number of possible permutations has been proven to be
#P-hard [8].
Theorem 4.1 1|β|1|∑wiCi ∝ Determining the optimal order of a firewall rule list
Proof Consider the 1|β|1|∑wiCi problem. Each of n jobs Ji, i ∈ I, has to be processed
without preemption on a single machine that can handle at most one job at a time. For each
i ∈ I, let wi be the associated weight. Furthermore, let G = (V,E) be a DAG that represents
the precedence order of the jobs Ji. Assume the processing time of each job equals 1 time
unit, the weights to be 0 ≤ wi ≤ 1 such that
∑
wi = 1, and β, which is G, to be a rule list
DAG. In this case, the optimization criterion
∑
wi · Ci is the same as
∑
pi · i, which is given
in equation 1. Clearly, the optimal ﬁrewall rule ordering problem has a solution if and only
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if 1|β|1|∑wiCi has a solution. Therefore, determining the optimal permutation of ﬁrewall
rules is NP-hard.
The sorting algorithm developed during the ﬁrst year of the project used the following
comparison to determine if neighboring (appear consecutively) rules should be interchanged.
if(pi < pi+1 AND ri /∩ ri+1)then
The sorting method compared neighboring rules in this fashion until further exchanges were
not possible. It is important to note the match probabilities will not change after sorting,
since only non-intersecting rules may be exchanged. Sorting rules in this fashion can have
positive impact on the average number of comparisons required. The algorithm reduced
the average number of comparisons upwards of 70% for small policies, which is a signiﬁ-
cant improvement. However, larger more realistic rule-sets were not able to have the same
performance increase.
The augmented algorithm developed this year also considered neighboring rules; however
an exchange never occurs if the rules intersect and have diﬀerent actions. This test preserves
any precedence relationships in the policy. For example, the new sorting algorithm used
such a comparison to determine if neighboring rules should be exchanged. Note, ai denotes
the action associated with the ith rule.
if(pi < pi+1 AND (ri /∩ ri+1 OR ai == ai+1))then
Unlike the previous method, sorting in this fashion may impact the match probabilities. If
two rules do not intersect, then a relative reorder will not eﬀect the match probability since
the appropriate ﬁrst match is maintained for any packet, which is given in X. If two rules
intersect and have the same action, then a relative reorder will change the match probability,
since the rule that appears ﬁrst in the relative reorder will have a higher probability (at the
expense of the other rule, which may need to be reordered). This simple modiﬁcation can
result in further reductions in the average number of rule comparisons. The performance
increase is depicted in ﬁgure 8. As seen in the ﬁgure, the augmented sorting method con-
sistently performs better. This is because exchanges can still occur even if the dependency
percentage is high. If an exchange occurs between two rules with the same action, a portion
of the probability will be shifted towards the beginning of the list.
4.2 Trie-Based Policy Optimization
The policy trie and PDT representations described in section 3.3 dramatically reduce the
number of comparisons required to process a packet. Similar to policy list sorting, the
average number of comparisons can be further improved by organizing the trie such that the
more popular rules appear towards the left. Since constructing the trie may reorder rules,
building a trie from a sorted list may not result in a sorted trie. Furthermore, exchanging
sub-tries of diﬀerent speciﬁcities runs the risk of violating the integrity of the associated
policy. As a result, sorting tries and PDTs is limited to comparisons between rules of the
same speciﬁcity (nodes that share the same parent node). In ﬁrewall policies controlling of
a wide variety of services and hosts, this severely limits the eﬀectiveness of sorting.
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(a) Original policy trie.
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Figure 9: Original and sorted trie representations of the ﬁrewall rules given in ﬁgure 1. Dashed
edges represent precedence constraints between nodes that share the same parent.
22
As with list-based policies, policy-DAGs can be used to model the precedence relation-
ships between sub-tries. Sorting based on the constraints of a DAG allows the potential
reordering of rules of diﬀerent speciﬁcities. Given a parent node in the trie, a DAG is cre-
ated with nodes representing each of the children’s sub-tries. These nodes are comprised
of the most general root to leaf path beginning with each respective child. Nodes are then
compared to determine where subset relationships exist and edges are drawn to represent
the subsequent precedence relationships. In ﬁgure 9(a) the children of the root node result in
two edges being drawn. Three rules in the TCP sub-trie and the one rule in the UDP sub-trie
intersect with the default rule in the * sub-trie. Edges are drawn between TCP and *, as
well as between UDP and *. In contrast, consider the children of the TCP sub-trie. Rules
in the 140.* sub-trie do not intersect with rules in the 150.* sub-trie, so an edge is not
drawn between these siblings. Based on the DAG, the sub-tries can be reordered to improve
performance without violating policy integrity, which is the basis of the sorting technique
described in the next section.
4.2.1 Ordering Policy Sub-Tries
Consider a policy trie T that contains sibling nodes i and j, where Ti is the sub-trie with
i as the root node and Tj is a sub-trie with j as the root node. Let P (i) be the sum of
the probabilities of the rules contained in sub-trie of root i, while C(i) denotes the number
of comparisons required to completely traverse sub-trie that has i as the root node, equal
to the number of branches. In order to reduce the average number of tuple comparisons,
sub-tries that share the same parent node should be ordered such that the P (i) values are
non-ascending and higher match probabilities occur ﬁrst, from left to right. If sub-tries
that share a parent node have the same probability, P (i) equals P (j), then they should be
arranged such that their C(·) values appear in non-descending order.
Though reordering two rules may be beneﬁcial, the constraints of a policy DAG must be
considered to ensure integrity. For example, take two neighboring sub-tries Ti and Ti+1 that
share the same parent node and are out of order. Let Ti /∩ Tj indicate the rules in Ti do not
intersect with the rules in Tj (rs /∩ rt, ∀rs ∈ Ti, ∀rt ∈ Tj). The two sub-tries can be rotated
about the parent if and only if Ti /∩ Ti+1 or if all the rules in sub-tries Ti and Ti+1 have
the same action. Similar to ﬁnding the linear sequence of a policy DAG’s, these conditions
maintain the policy trie integrity, which is proven in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.2 Given a policy trie T , exchanging sub-tries that have the same parent node
based on the associated policy-DAG maintains integrity.
Proof Consider two sub-tries, Ti and Tj , in a policy trie T (i < j, without loss of generality).
Ti and Tj may be exchanged if there is no edge from any node in Ti to Tj. By construction,
the nodes in each set represent the most general root to leaf path in their respective sub-trie
and by deﬁnition each node is a subset of its respective power set, Ti or Tj.
Suppose that a set of packets d overlaps with rules in both Ti and Tj and the associated
rule actions are diﬀerent. The reordering of these two rules would result in a shadowing. It
follows that, by deﬁnition of the DAG, there exists an edge between these two rules. This
violates the choice of Ti and Tj . By contradiction, no such rules will exist and therefore, no
anomaly will be introduced into a sorted trie.
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function sortTrie(trieNode m)
if(m is leaf node) return
done = false
while(!done)
done = true
for each child i of m that has a right neighboring sibling
if(P (i) < P (i+ 1) AND (Ti /∩ Ti+1 OR
action(Ti)==action(Ti+1))then
exchange Ti and Ti+1
done = false
elseif(P (i) == P (i+ 1) AND C(i) > C(i+ 1) AND
(Ti /∩ Ti+1 OR action(Ti)==action(Ti+1))then
exchange Ti and Ti+1
done = false
endif
endfor
endwhile
for each child i of m
sortTrie(i)
endfor
endfunction
Figure 10: Trie sorting algorithm.
4.2.2 A Trie Sorting Algorithm
Using the guidelines for maintaining integrity described in the previous section, ﬁgure 4
presents a simple sorting technique for policy tries or PDTs. The algorithm starts with a
call at the root node, sorting child sub-tries based on match-probability and the number of
branches contained in each sub-trie. As previously described, an exchange of sub-tries does
not occur if the sub-tries intersect and have diﬀerent actions. The function is then called on
each child node, and the process repeats until the leaf nodes are reached.
At each step, probabilities are calculated for sub-tries whose constraints permit compar-
ison. Probability values for nodes created as the result of the intersection procedure are
given a probability less than either of their two original rules, as they will match a smaller
set of packets than their ancestors. For all other sub-tries, their cumulative probability is
the summation of the probabilities of their leaves.
In the event that two probabilities are equal, the tie break is decided by the number
of branches in each trie, C(·). In this case, we want to make sure that tie break always
results in a better ordering, satisfying the inequality P (j) · C(j) + P (i) · (C(i) + C(j)) <
P (i) · C(i) + P (j) · (C(i) + C(j)), where (P (j), C(j)) and (P (i), C(i)) are the cumulative
probabilities and branches for two sub-tries Ti and Tj. By construction, we know that
P (i) = P (j) and C(i) > C(j). Simpliﬁcation yields the true statement, C(j) < C(i),
conﬁrming that the inequality is satisﬁed.
Figure 9(b) depicts the sorted version of the policy trie given in 9(a). The ﬁrst function
call attempts to sort the sub-tries TCP, UDP, and * (protocol) about their parent node.
Although the probability for the sub-tries TCP and UDP equal (P (TCP) = P (UDP) = 0.3) the
sub-tries are exchanged since C(TCP) < C(UDP). Although P (*) has the highest probability,
it cannot be moved towards the left because of precedence edges. The children of TCP node
are then sorted (IP source), where the 140.* and 150.* sub-tries are exchanged based on
the number of branches. Sorting continues with the grandchildren of the 140.* node, the
130.* and * sub-tries (IP destination), which are not exchanged since they intersect.
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Figure 11: The average and worst case number of tuple-comparisons required.
This algorithm can be implemented by keeping buckets attached to rule action tuples to
measure the relative frequency of matches for individual rules. Then, based on this infor-
mation, the tries can be rebalanced oﬄine and implemented in the ﬁrewall. In simulations,
sorted tries provided signiﬁcantly better processing time to all traﬃc by using DAG sorting
to favor high frequency rules.
4.2.3 Trie-Based Policy Optimization Experimental Results
The previous sections described how policy tries and PDTs can be sorted to reduce the
average number of tuple comparisons. Simulation results in this section will measure the
impact of the sorting method under realistic conditions. Firewall policies of sizes ranging
from 50 to 500 rules were generated using a random-rule generator that ensured anomaly
free policies and imitated the shape of common security policies. Sets of 10,000 packets were
then generated and skewed to favor random subsets of rules over others to simulate realistic
traﬃc distributions. Of note, our traﬃc generation algorithm mimics high ﬂow to a small set
of services, with no regard for their placement in the policy. This is in contrast to the models
used in [4], which sought to produce DoS traﬃc that exploited the structure of linear and
backtracking trie implementations. Linear, back-tracking trie, and PDT implementations
were created and evaluated in their original form. Then, based on frequency analysis of the
traﬃc set, they were rebalanced using DAG sorting and evaluated for comparison.
The results for the average and higher number of tuple-comparisons are given in ﬁgure
11. As reported in [4], the trie implementations performed signiﬁcantly better than the list,
yielding a 81% reduction in the number of tuple-comparisons required. In the case of back-
tracking tries, balancing resulted in 25% fewer comparisons than unbalanced tries. This is a
result of the reduction of cumulative delay by processing most packets faster. Not only does
the targeted traﬃc stream beneﬁt, but those packets now requiring more comparisons also
beneﬁt. Though the average number of comparisons decreased, the worst case performance
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Source Destination
No. Proto. IP Port IP Port Action Prob.
4 UDP 150.* * * 3030 accept 0.3
5a UDP * * * * deny 0.3
3 TCP 150.* * 120.* 90 accept 0.15
1 TCP 140.* * 130.* 80 deny 0.1
2 TCP 140.* * * 80 accept 0.05
5b TCP * * * * deny 0.1
Table 2: Security policy given in ﬁgure 2 sorted with r5 (*, *, *, *, deny) into rules r5a and r5b.
for single packet evaluation for sorted tries remained the same. This is due to the nature of
back-tracking search in which all paths must be traversed for some packets no matter what
the order.
Push-Down Tries performed the best of all when sorted. The sorted PDT required 83%
fewer comparison on average than a list and 27% fewer comparisons on average than an
unsorted PDT. In addition, the maximum number of comparisons in worst case situations
decreased slightly, a function of their structural replication rules. As unpopular rules are
shuﬄed to the back of the PDT, they are not replicated elsewhere in the PDT unless needed.
This eﬀectively allows certain rules to be excluded from most evaluations even in worst-case
situations.
4.3 Rule Splitting
Rule splitting takes a general rule and creates more speciﬁc rules that collectively perform
the same action over the same set of packets. Here, we are utilizing rule splitting to reduce
the average number of comparisons. For example in table 2, rule r5 is split into two separate
rules, r5a for UDP and r5b for TCP. Once the rules are positioned based on their probabilities
and their relation to other rules, the average number of rule comparisons is reduced to 2.6
(after sorting and splitting) which is a 16% less.
It many not be advantageous to split a general rule since it adds another rule to the
policy. For example, assume a policy contains 20 rules where the ﬁrst 19 rules have the same
probability. Assume the last rule can be split and the new speciﬁc rule has a probability that
is 3
4
of the last rule. The impact of the probability of the last rule and the location of the
new split rule, m, is depicted in ﬁgure 12. The average number of comparisons is reduced
as the split rule is located closer to the ﬁrst rule (surface decreases as m approaches one).
Furthermore, splitting yields better results when the general rule has a high probability.
However as seen in ﬁgure 12(b), the closer the speciﬁc rule is to the location of the original
rule the average number of comparisons increases, which is the penalty of adding one more
rule to the policy.
The eﬀect of splitting a single rule can be described mathematically as follows. Consider
n rules where rule rn can be split into rules rn,l and rn,r (whose union is the original rule).
In addition, assume the split rule rn,l will be located at the m
th position (1 ≤ m < n), while
rule rn,r will remain at the n
th location. We want to determine the best location m, which
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Figure 12: Example of splitting the last rule in a policy. Surfaces depict the impact of split rule
location and the probability of the last rule (pn). The probability of the new split rule is
3
4
· pn.
yields a lower average number of comparisons as compared to the original rule set. This can
be deﬁned mathematically in the following formula.
n∑
i=1
i · pi >
m−1∑
i=1
i · pi + m · pn,l +
n−1∑
i=m
(i + 1) · pi + (n + 1) · pn,r
The left side of the inequality is the average number of comparisons for the original rule
set. The right hand side of the inequality is the average number of comparisons with the
speciﬁc rule at location m. If we assume the rules located between m and n have an equal
probability (denoted as p) we can solve the previous equation for m.
m <
n · p− n · pn + (n + 1) · pn,r
p− pn,l
The new rule must be located between the ﬁrst and mth; however, its ﬁnal location will
depend on the relationship with the other rules (cannot be placed before any rule for which
it is a superset). This result can be applied iteratively to multiple rules and repeatedly to
the same rule.
5 Parallel Firewalls Designs
As described in the introduction, parallelization oﬀers a scalable technique for improving
the performance of network ﬁrewalls. Using this approach an array of m ﬁrewalls processes
packets in parallel, as seen in ﬁgure 13. However, the designs depicted in the ﬁgure diﬀer
based on what is distributed: packets or rules. Using terminology from parallel computing,
distributing packets can be considered data parallel since the data (packets) is distributed
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Source Destination
No. Proto. IP Port IP Port Action Prob.
1 UDP 190.1.1.* * * 80 deny 0.05
2 UDP 210.1.* * * 90 accept 0.10
3 TCP 180.* * 180.* 90 accept 0.15
4 TCP 210.* * 220.* 80 accept 0.20
5 UDP 190.* * * * accept 0.20
6 * * * * * deny 0.30
Table 3: Example ﬁrewall policy used for the parallel ﬁrewall examples.
across the ﬁrewall [9]. In contrast, function parallel designs distribute the policy rules across
the ﬁrewalls.
5.1 Data-Parallel Architecture
As shown in ﬁgure 13(a), data parallel ﬁrewall architecture consists of an array of identically
conﬁgured ﬁrewalls [6]. Each ﬁrewall j in the system implements a local policy Rj, where
Rj = R. Arriving packets are distributed across the ﬁrewalls for processing (one packet is
sent to one ﬁrewall), allowing diﬀerent packets to be processed in parallel. Since the accept
set for each ﬁrewall j equals the accept set of the original policy, Aj = A, policy integrity is
maintained.
Distributing packets across the array allows a data parallel ﬁrewall to increase system
throughput (number of packets processed per unit time) as compared to a traditional (single
machine) ﬁrewall [6]. Furthermore, increased throughput is easily achieved with the addition
of ﬁrewalls; therefore, this approach is very scalable. However the data parallel approach
has three major disadvantages. First, stateful inspection requires all traﬃc from a certain
connection or exchange to traverse the same ﬁrewall (where the stateful rule resides) or the
constant distribution and management of stateful rules. As a result, successful connection
tracking is diﬃcult to perform at high speeds using the data parallel approach [6, 27]. Second,
distributing packets is only beneﬁcial when each ﬁrewall in the array has a signiﬁcant amount
of traﬃc to process (ﬁrewalls are never idle). The performance beneﬁt (higher throughput)
only occurs under high traﬃc loads. Finally, the design does not diﬀerentiate between traﬃc
classes only load balancing. Therefore eﬃciently maintaining diﬀerent QoS requirements is
not possible.
5.2 Function Parallel Architecture with Gate
Unlike the data parallel model which distributes packets, the function parallel design dis-
tributes policy rules across the ﬁrewall array [15]. The function parallel design consists of
multiple ﬁrewalls connected in parallel and a gate device. As seen in ﬁgure 13(b), when a
packet arrives to the function parallel system it is forwarded to every ﬁrewall and the gate.
Each ﬁrewall processes the packet using its local policy, including any state information.
Since the local policies are smaller than the original, the processing delay is reduced as com-
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R1 = {r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6}
packet
distributor
•
R2 = {r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6}
(a) Data-parallel, packets dis-
tributed across equal ﬁrewalls.
R1 = {r1, r3, r5}
packet
duplicator
• gate
controlR2 = {r2, r4, r6}
(b) Function parallel with gate,
rules distributed across ﬁrewalls.
R1 = {r2, r3, r4, r6}
packet
duplicator
•
R2 = {r1, r5, r6}
(c) Function parallel, rules distributed across
independent ﬁrewalls.
Figure 13: Various parallel designs for network ﬁrewalls. The original security policy consists of
six rules R = {r1, ..., r6} and each design consists of two ﬁrewalls (depicted as solid rectangles,
where local policies are given within each rectangle).
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pared to a traditional ﬁrewall. Once the ﬁrewall ﬁnishes processing a packet, it then signals
the gate indicating either no match was found, or provides the rule number and action if a
match was found. The gate stores the results for the packet and determines the ﬁnal action
to perform using the policy DAG.
Since ﬁrewalls only implement a portion of the original policy, it is critical that rule
distribution is done to maintain integrity. The integrity of a policy R is maintained if the
rules are distributed such that every rule in R exists in the system and if the precedence
constraints of R are observed in each local policy Rj . As a result, the accept set of the gate
equals the accept set of the original policy [15]. This is more formally stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 5.1 An array of m firewalls and a gate device arranged in a function parallel
fashion enforcing a comprehensive policy R will maintain integrity if policy rules are dis-
tributed to each firewall j such that: every rule in R is assigned to at least one firewall and
the precedence constraints of R are observed in Rj.
Proof Let R′ be the ordered subset of the rules in policy R that matches a packet d. Given a
ﬁrst match policy, the ﬁrst rule in R′ is the correct result. The ﬁrst condition of the theorem
ensures that these rules will exist in the system. The second condition ensures shadowing
will never occur if multiple rules from R′ exist in the same local policy, therefore then local
ﬁrst match is produced for d is the correct result. If these rules exist in diﬀerent local policies
then the gate will be given multiple matches from the set R′ for d; however, the gate will
determine the appropriate rule since it always applies the lowest numbered rule of the local
ﬁrst matches, thus policy integrity is maintained.
Therefore, a traditional single ﬁrewall and the function parallel ﬁrewall will always give the
same result for the same packet. Several diﬀerent distributions are possible that adhere the
described guidelines. Essentially the rule numbers (indexes from the original policy) in each
local policy must be in ascending order, as seen in ﬁgure 13(b). Note the policy used is given
in table 3.
The function parallel design has several signiﬁcant advantages over traditional and data
parallel ﬁrewalls. First, the function parallel design results in faster processing since every
ﬁrewall is utilized to process a single packet. Reducing the processing time, instead of
the arrival rate (as done in the data parallel design), yields better performance since each
ﬁrewall in the array processes packets regardless of the traﬃc load. The processing delay can
be further reduced with the addition of new ﬁrewalls. Second, unlike the data parallel design,
the function parallel design can maintain state information about existing connections. The
new state rule can be placed in any ﬁrewall since a packet will be processed by every ﬁrewall.
There are three disadvantages of the function parallel design. First, there is a possible
limitation on scalability, since the system cannot have more ﬁrewalls than rules. However,
given the size of most ﬁrewall policies range in the thousands of rules [38], the scalability limit
is not an important concern. Second, the system is unable to diﬀerentiate traﬃc, therefore
speciﬁc QoS constraints may not be provided. Thirdly, the gate requires specialized hardware
and introduces an additional delay. Therefore, to achieve the full potential of the function
parallel design it is preferable to eliminate the gate device and allow the ﬁrewalls to operate
independently.
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5.3 Independent Function Parallel Architecture
As described in the previous subsection, a function parallel system consists of an array of
ﬁrewalls where arriving packets are duplicated and policy rules are distributed. Each ﬁrewall
processes an arriving packet using its local policy and a gate device is required to ensure
integrity is maintained. However, it is possible to allow the ﬁrewalls to operate independently,
thus eliminating the gate device and any need for inter-ﬁrewall communications.
Consider a function parallel system consisting ofm ﬁrewalls that enforces a comprehensive
security policy R. Each ﬁrewall j in the array has a local comprehensive policy Rj that is
a portion of the security policy R. Therefore, each ﬁrewall has a local accept set Aj and a
deny set Dj. Integrity will maintained without a gate device if rules are distributed such
that a packet d ∈ D is dropped by all ﬁrewalls, while a packet a ∈ A is accepted by only one
ﬁrewall. This is more formally stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.2 An array of m firewalls arranged in a function parallel fashion enforcing a
comprehensive policy R can operate independently and maintain integrity if policy rules are
distributed such that: each local policy is comprehensive,
⋃m
j=1 A
j = A, and
⋂m
j=1 A
j = ∅.
Proof The ﬁrst requirement, comprehensiveness, ensures each local policy will either accept
or deny a packet (
⋃m
j=1 U
j = ∅). The second requirement ⋃mj=1 Aj = A indicates that
collectively the system will accept only the packets accepted by the policy R. The last
requirement,
⋂m
j=1 A
j = ∅, ensures multiple ﬁrewalls will never accept the same packet (no
overlaps in the local accept sets), therefore only one copy of a packet will be accepted. As
such, the integrity of the policy R is maintained by the parallel ﬁrewall.
An example distribution of the policy given in table 3 across an array of two independent
ﬁrewalls is shown in ﬁgure 13(c). In this case, the local policy of the upper ﬁrewall will
accept only packets from the 210 and 180 address range, while the lower ﬁrewall will only
accept packets from the 190 address range. Duplicating the deny all rule, r6, is required to
make the local-policies comprehensive. Other distributions are possible, such as distributing
rules based on the protocol (R1 = {r1, r2, r5, r6} and R2 = {r3, r4, r6}) or destination ports
(R1 = {r1, r4, r5, r6} and R2 = {r2, r3, r6}). In each example a precedence edge will never
connect two rules in two diﬀerent ﬁrewalls (no inter-ﬁrewall edges), and as a result, integrity is
maintained. Policy distribution can be done to balance the packet load (distribute popular
rules across the array) or to achieve a certain QoS objective. Of course the number of
distributions will depend on the original security policy, where fewer precedence edges allow
more distributions.
Like the function parallel system that relies on a gate device, the independent function
parallel system can manage state information since a packet is sent to every ﬁrewall. However,
allowing the ﬁrewalls to operate independently has several important unique advantages.
First, the elimination of the gate device causes the function parallel design to be compatible
with a variety of ﬁrewall devices since specialized equipment is not needed. Second, the
independent function parallel system will have lower processing delays than an equivalent
data parallel system or a function parallel system with a gate device. Third, local-policies
can be designed to process certain types of traﬃc on certain ﬁrewalls, yielding the ability
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to provide service diﬀerentiation which is an important component for maintaining QoS
requirements.
Although the system has many signiﬁcant advantages, it is not redundant. Integrity
will be lost if a ﬁrewall fails since a portion of the policy (local accept set) will not be
available. Fortunately, loss of a ﬁrewall will only result in a more conservative policy (fewer
packets accepted), which is better than the previous function parallel design with gate device.
Redundancy can be provided by duplicating the local policy to another ﬁrewall. As done in
[6], ﬁrewalls can be interconnected to determine if redundant rules should be processed.
5.3.1 Policy Distribution
Given a function parallel ﬁrewall array and a ﬁrewall policy, several rule distributions may
be able to maintain integrity. Identifying the sets of rules that form independent accept sets,
called rule chains, can help maintain integrity when rules are distributed. A rule chain is the
smallest ordered list of intersecting rules that forms an accept set which does not intersect
with another rule chain.
A rule chain can be found by starting with a rule in R that does not have any preceding
constraints (no incoming preceding edges in the policy DAG) and then following the prece-
dence edges until a rule is encountered that has no successive precedence constraints (no
outgoing precedence edges). All the rules along this path belong to a rule chain. Note that
an accept rule can only belong to one rule chain. Therefore, if two chains share an accept
rule, then they are considered one chain. In contrast, deny rules can be duplicated across
multiple chains. For example, rule r6, given in table 3, would be the last rule in each rule
chain. Once all the rules have been associated with a chain, all possible rule chains have
been found for the policy. For example, the rule chains for the policy given in table 3 are
c1 = {r1, r5, r6}, c2 = {r2, r6}, c3 = {r3, r6}, and c4 = {r4, r6}.
Once the rule chains have been determined, they can be distributed to the ﬁrewall nodes
in the array. When multiple chains are given to a node, the rules that belong to the chains
must be merged to form the local policy. Merging requires rules to adhere to the precedence
constraints speciﬁed be the original policy DAG (as in rule sorting). For example, merging
c2, c3, and c6 requires placing r6 at the end.
Distributing chains and merging rules will maintain policy integrity since the accept
sets for the chains are independent (ﬁrst condition), and every accept rule in the original
policy exists in only one chain (second condition). Furthermore, merging the rules assures
shadowing will not occur in the local policies (assuming shadowing does not occur in the
original policy). This approach is more formally stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3 Distributing and merging the rule chains of a policy R across function parallel
firewall will maintain policy integrity.
Proof Assume d chains are found in the policy R and let Ak represent the accept set of the
kth chain. Each rule chain represents an independent accept set since all intersecting rules
will always belong to the same chain and accept rules only belong to one chain, therefore the
intersection requirement is met (
⋂d
k=1 A
k = ∅). For the second requirement, ⋃dk=1 Ak = A,
consider a packet that is accepted by rule ri in the policy R, therefore ri is the ﬁrst match.
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The rule ri would also be the ﬁrst match in the chain that contains ri regardless which
processor ri resides since all intersecting rules will belong to the same chain (any subsequent
matching rules would appear after ri) and merging prevents shadowing. In addition, since
every rule must belong to a chain, the second condition is satisﬁed.
5.3.2 Policy Distribution Performance
A rule distribution is sought that minimizes the number of comparisons required to determine
an accept [16]. Given a comprehensive policy R and an array of m ﬁrewalls, each ﬁrewall j
in the array will implement a local-policy Rj which consists of nj rules where rji is the i
th
rule in the local-policy. In addition, let pji is the probability of the i
th rule in local-policy j
being the ﬁrst match.
To determine the average number of comparisons for a given packet, assume each ﬁrewall
in the array requires one time-unit to compare the packet to a rule. Then assume the
ﬁrewalls are initially empty and synchronized so that each starts processing a packet at the
same time. When the ﬁrst packet arrives, it is compared to the ﬁrst rule in each of the
m local policies. Therefore, after the ﬁrst time-unit, the packet has been compared to m
rules. The probability that the original ﬁrst match (as deﬁned by the R) is found in the ﬁrst
time-unit is the sum of the probabilities of the ﬁrst rule in each local policy. Similarly, the
probability the ﬁrst-match occurs in two time-units is equal to the sum of the probabilities
of the second rule in each local policy. The expected number of rule comparisons required
to ﬁnd the original ﬁrst match in a function parallel ﬁrewall can be computed as
max (nj)∑
i=1
i ·
m∑
j=1
pji =
m∑
j=1
nj∑
i=1
i · pji ,=
m∑
j=1
E(Rj) (2)
However, each rule in R is considered only once in the calculation, since only the average
number of comparisons required for a ﬁrst-match is considered. If a rule is duplicated (such as
r6 in the distribution given in ﬁgure 13(b)), then it is only considered once in the calculation
at its earliest occurrence within the local policies. As a result of only considering each rule
once, the sum of the probabilities across the local policies should equal one,
∑m
j=1
∑nj
i=1 p
j
i =
1.
For example, the expected number of comparisons required to ﬁnd the original ﬁrst match
for the system given in Figure 13(b) is
1 · (p11 + p21) + 2 · (p12 + p22) + 3 · (p13 + p23) =
1 · (p2 + p1) + 2 · (p3 + p5) + 3 · (p4 + p6) = 2.35
Note that rule r6 is duplicated in the distribution to maintain integrity. It is the third rule
in R1 and the fourth rule in R2; however, the rule is only considered once in the calculation
above. Using the same two ﬁrewall function parallel system, if the rules were distributed
based on protocol then the expected number of comparisons required to ﬁnd the original
ﬁrst match would be
1 · (p11 + p21) + 2 · (p12 + p22) + 3 · (p13 + p23) = 1 · (p2 + p3) + 2 · (p2 + p4) + 3 · (p5 + p6) = 2.30
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Figure 14: Packet delay as compared to the expected number of rule comparison for a function
parallel system (four ﬁrewall array) and a 48 rule policy. Each point represents a equivalent
distribution across the array.
The second distribution can be considered better since it requires fewer compares to deter-
mine the ﬁrst-match. To achieve optimal performance, it is necessary to ﬁnd a rule distri-
bution that minimizes the average number of comparisons before the original ﬁrst match is
found.
The validity of the expected number of comparisons (equation 2) as a performance metric
was evaluated under realistic conditions using simulation. Each experiment simulated a
function parallel system consisting of a four ﬁrewall array implementing a 48 rule policy.
The rule match probability followed an inverse Zipf distribution, which is commensurate
with actual ﬁrewall policies [25, 38]. In addition, rules did not overlap (except for a default
deny all rule) which allows for a large number of possible distributions.
Given the 48 rule security policy, the performance of the distribution that minimized
average number of rule compares was compared against 10,000 random distributions that
each maintained integrity of the original policy. For each simulation the ﬁrewall system
packets arrived at a rate of 1 Gbps, and the average ﬁrst-match delay and the sum of the
average number of comparisons were collected.
Figure 14(a) shows the delay and expected number of comparisons for diﬀerent distribu-
tions and the same traﬃc trace. The traﬃc trace was generated such that packet lengths
were uniformly distributed between 40 and 1500 bytes and all legal IP addresses were equally
probable. As seen in the graph, the expected number of comparisons is linearly proportional
to the ﬁrst-match delay. In addition, the best performance is obtained when the expected
number of comparisons is minimized. Therefore the average number of comparisons is a very
good metric given known traﬃc.
Performance of the metric under randomly generated traﬃc is depicted in ﬁgure 14(b).
In these experiments packets were randomly generated using the same parameters as the ﬁrst
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experiment. As seen in this graph, the performance metric is not able to provide an exact
performance prediction due to the variability in the traﬃc. However, the best performance
still occurs when the average number of compares is minimized. Therefore, the metric is
still able to provide insight into performance and can be used to compare diﬀerent rule
distributions in a function parallel ﬁrewall.
5.3.3 Policy Distribution Algorithm
Improving the overall performance of the ﬁrewall is achieved by balancing the number of rules
on each node as well as placing rule chains so that high probability rules are located near
the beginning of each local policy. However, the goal of balancing the number of rules across
nodes when distributing rule chains is diﬃcult. Examine the simple case of rule distribution
where the probability of each rule in the original policy is the same. An algorithm to ﬁnd
the optimal solution must then be able to ﬁnd the distribution with the minimum average
diﬀerence in rule counts between the nodes. This case is equivalent to the Equal-Subset-Sum
problem, described as follows:
Definition: (EQUAL-SUBSET-SUM). Given a set S = {s1, ..., sn} of positive integers,
are there two disjoint non-empty subsets X, Y ⊆ S such that the sum of the integers of X
is equal to the sum of the integers of Y .
An algorithm which can ﬁnd an optimal distribution of rules when all probabilities are
the same, can then ﬁnd a solution to the Equal-Subset-Sum problem, where the set S of
positive integers is equivalent to the number of rules in each chain, and the subsets X and
Y are nodes. The Equal-Subset-Sum problem, however, has been shown to exist in the class
of problems known as NP-Complete.
A simple rule distribution algorithm ﬁrst sorts the rule chains according to the average
number of comparisons per rule chain ; for example, L = {c2, c3, c4, c1} since {E(c2) <
E(c3) < E(c4) < E(c1)}. Using the sorted list, the chains are distributed and merged across
the processors in a horizontal fashion. As a result, chains with the smallest average number
of comparisons are distributed ﬁrst (placed near the end of the local policies). This simple,
greedy distribution technique ensures the most popular rules appear near the beginning of
the local policies. For the function parallel system shown in ﬁgure 13(b) and the policy
given in table 3, the distribution using this method would be R1 = {c3, c1} and R2 = {c2, c4}
which is equivalent to R1 = {r1, r5, r3, r6} and R2 = {r4, r2, r6}. The average number of
comparisons for the ﬁrst match is 2.25, using this distribution.
5.3.4 System Redundancy
Similar to the traditional and data parallel ﬁrewalls, a disadvantage of the current function
parallel design is its inability to withstand a single ﬁrewall failure. If a single ﬁrewall fails in
the function parallel system, then part of the policy is lost and integrity is not maintained.
A simple solution commonly used for traditional ﬁrewalls is to duplicate the entire system;
however, this solution is cost prohibitive, not eﬃcient, and diﬃcult to manage.
Redundancy can be provided in the function parallel design by replicating rules (including
state generated), instead of ﬁrewalls. Consider the function parallel system depicted in ﬁgure
15(a), that consists of three ﬁrewalls and an six rule policy. If the local rule list of the neighbor
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R1 = {r1, r2, r6}
packet
duplicator
• R2 = {r2, r3, r6}
R3 = {r4, r6}
(a) Function parallel non-redundant rule dis-
tribution.
R1 = {r1, r5, r2, r3 r6}
packet
duplicator
• R2 = {r2, r3, r4 r6}
R3 = {r4, r1, r5 r6}
(b) Function parallel with redundant rule dis-
tribution. Boxed rules within local policies
are only used if neighboring ﬁrewall fails.
Figure 15: Function parallel rule distributions, each system consisting of three ﬁrewalls and six
rules.
below is added to the end of every ﬁrewall, as seen in ﬁgure 15(b), then any non-continuous
ﬁrewall nodes can fail and integrity will be maintained.
The criteria for maintaining integrity still applies and may be problematic. Since the
last rule in many policies is a deny (or possibly accept) all, the redundant rules given to
the right-most ﬁrewall are shadowed (r8 shadows r1 and r2 in ﬁgure 15(b)). This can be
addressed by exchanging the redundant rules with the original rule in the right-most ﬁrewall
if the left-most ﬁrewall fails. The redundant design also requires short-circuit evaluations to
prevent multiple ﬁrewalls from evaluating the same rule. However unlike current solutions,
the function parallel design does not require the duplication of ﬁrewalls for redundancy.
5.4 Theoretical Models
We utilized theoretical models to guide system design and simulation to predict performance.
If arrivals and service times are assumed to be exponentially distributed, then a ﬁrewall
system can be considered an open network of M/M/1 queues (Jackson network) [7, 32].
Probabilities can be assigned to each link to indicate the likelihood of moving to the next
ﬁrewall, which are given from the policy proﬁle (hit ratio) described in section 4. The average
end-to-end delay for q cascading ﬁrewalls (traversal path) interconnected by a graph T can
be computed as
E(T ) =
q∑
i=1
1
μi − λi
where 1/μi is the service time (processing and transmission) and λi is the arrival rate to
ﬁrewall i. As a result, we have a theoretical model for the average delay across a ﬁrewall
system. Consider the parallel, function parallel, and hierarchical ﬁrewall designs given in
ﬁgure 13. Assume each ﬁrewall system consists of m ﬁrewalls and implements the same n
rule security policy. Let the total arrival rate to each system be λ packets per unit time and
assume each ﬁrewall can perform x rules per unit time.
For the parallel ﬁrewall, traﬃc arrives at the packet distributor, which evenly distributes
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the traﬃc. As a result the arrival rate to each ﬁrewall is λ
m
. The service rate is x
n
, since each
ﬁrewall implements the complete rule set. The end-to-end delay across any ﬁrewall in the
data parallel ﬁrewall is
Ed(T ) =
1
x
n
− λ
m
In contrast, rules are distributed across each ﬁrewall in the function parallel ﬁrewall.
Furthermore, all traﬃc arriving to the system is forwarded to each ﬁrewall. If we assume
the rules in each ﬁrewall are independent (rules distributed using a non-backtracking trie),
then the end-to-end delay across any ﬁrewall in the functional-parallel ﬁrewall is
Ef (T ) =
1
m·x
n
− λ
The relative speedup compared to a parallel ﬁrewall system is 1
m
; therefore, the functional-
parallel system has the potential to be m times faster than a (data) parallel system. However,
the scalability of the functional-parallel system is dependent on the rule set.
The impact of increase arrival rate, number of rules, and number of ﬁrewalls can be
compared theoretically using the equation given above. Figure 16 show the average packet
delay as the arrival rate increases. The parallel ﬁrewall performs better than the single
ﬁrewall since the system can process multiple packets simultaneously. The function parallel
system performs better than the parallel system which indicates reducing the processing
requirement is more signiﬁcant than reducing the arrival rate. This is also shown in ﬁgure
16(b) where the number of rules in the policy also increases.
The impact on increasing the number of rules on average packet delay is given in ﬁg-
ure 17(a). The data and function parallel systems consisted of ﬁve ﬁrewalls, however the
function parallel system performs better than the data parallel ﬁrewall. The performance
improvement is constant as the number of rules increases indicating the function parallel
design is better.
Figure 17(b) shows the average delay as the number of ﬁrewalls in the array increases.
As ﬁrewalls are added to the two parallel designs, the function parallel system continues to
reduce the average delay. The adding more ﬁrewalls to the function parallel design reduces
the number of rules per local policy, therefore reducing the average processing time. As
ﬁrewalls are added to the data parallel system the average delay remains constant. More
ﬁrewalls does not improve the performance since additional ﬁrewalls do not have packets to
process.
5.5 Parallel Firewall Experimental Results
The performance of a traditional single ﬁrewall, the data parallel ﬁrewall, and the function
parallel ﬁrewall (with gate device and independent) was measured under realistic conditions
using simulation. Firewalls were simulated to process 6 × 107 rules per second, which is
comparable to current technology.
For each experiment the parallel designs always consisted of the same number of ﬁre-
walls. The gate device delay was equivalent to processing three ﬁrewall rules. Short-circuit
evaluation was simulated for the gated design, where the ﬁrewalls in the array are notiﬁed to
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Figure 16: Theoretical comparison of diﬀerent ﬁrewall designs.
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Figure 17: Theoretical comparison of diﬀerent ﬁrewall designs.
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Figure 18: Packet delay as the packet arrival rate increases. Parallel designs consisted of ﬁve
ﬁrewalls.
stop processing a packet once the appropriate match was determined. No additional delay
was added to the data parallel system for packet distribution (load balancing); therefore, the
results observed for the data parallel design are better than what should be expected.
Packets lengths were uniformly distributed between 40 and 1500 bytes, while all legal
IP addresses were equally probable. Firewall rules were generated such that the rule match
probability was given by an inverse Zipf distribution. As a result, rules near the beginning
of the policy were speciﬁc (matched a limited range of packets) while rules near the end
were more general, which is commensurate with actual ﬁrewall policies [25, 38]. Rules were
distributed for the function parallel design such that no inter-ﬁrewall dependency edges
existed, and if possible, more popular rules were located at the top of the local-policies. This
distribution provides load balancing and ensures integrity is maintained.
Three sets of experiments were performed to determine the eﬀect of increasing arrival
rates, increasing policy size, and increasing number of ﬁrewalls. For each experiment 1000
simulations were performed, then the average and maximum packet delay were recorded.
5.5.1 Increasing Arrival Rates
The impact of increasing arrival rates on the four ﬁrewall designs is shown in ﬁgure 18.
In this experiment, each system implemented the same 1024 rule ﬁrewall policy [38] and
both parallel designs consisted of ﬁve ﬁrewalls. The arrival rate ranged from 5 × 103 to
1× 106 packets per second (the highest arrival rate resulted in more than 6 Gbps of traﬃc
on average).
As seen in ﬁgure 18, the parallel designs performed considerable better than the tradi-
tional single ﬁrewall. As the arrival rate increased, the parallel designs were able to handle
larger volumes to traﬃc due to the distributed design. As seen in ﬁgure 18(a), the function
parallel ﬁrewall had an average delay that was consistently 4.0 times lower than the data
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Figure 19: Packet delay as the number of rules increases. Parallel designs consisted of ﬁve
ﬁrewalls.
parallel design, while the independent function parallel design average delay was 4.3 times
lower. This is expected because each ﬁrewall in the function parallel design is used to in-
spect arriving packets regardless of the arrival rate. The impact of the gate delay is more
prominent as the arrival rate increases. Similar to the average delay results, the function
parallel design had a maximum delay 34% lower than the data parallel design, while the
independent function parallel design was 38% lower.
5.5.2 Increasing Policy Size
The eﬀect of increasing the policy size (number of rules) for the four ﬁrewall designs is
given in ﬁgure 19. In this experiment, the arrival rate was again 1× 105 packets per second
(yielding more than 0.5 Gbps of traﬃc on average) and both parallel designs consisted of
ﬁve ﬁrewalls. Policies ranged from 60 to 3840 rules which is considered within the bounds
of typical policies [38].
When the policies consisted of relatively few rules, the single and data parallel ﬁrewalls
observed similar delays. However as seen in ﬁgure 19(a), the parallel designs performed
considerable better than the traditional single ﬁrewall once the policy contained more than
1000 rules. The function parallel ﬁrewall had an average delay that was 4.12 times lower
than the data parallel design, while the independent ﬁrewall was 3.79 times lower. This
slight diﬀerence is primarily due to short-circuit evaluation, where the gate informs ﬁrewalls
to stop processing a packet once the appropriate match is found. However this is only a
marginal gain given the inter-ﬁrewall communication and specialized hardware required for
short-circuit evaluation.
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Figure 20: Packet delay as the number of ﬁrewalls increases. Policies consisted of 1024 rules.
5.5.3 Increasing Firewall Array Size
Figure 20 shows the eﬀect of increasing number of ﬁrewalls for the two parallel ﬁrewall
designs. The number of ﬁrewalls ranged from 2 to 256, the number of rules was 1024, and
arrival rate was 2× 105 packets per second (again, yielding more than 1 Gbps of traﬃc).
As seen in ﬁgure 20(a), the function parallel design consistently performed better than
the data parallel ﬁrewall design. As ﬁrewalls were added, the function parallel system always
observed a reduction in the delay. This delay reduction trend is expected until the number
of ﬁrewalls equals the number of rules. In contrast, the delay for data parallel design quickly
stabilizes and the addition of more ﬁrewalls has no impact. This is because after a certain
point any additional ﬁrewalls will remain idle, thus these additional ﬁrewalls are unable
to reduce the delay. As additional ﬁrewalls are added the performance diﬀerence between
the function parallel ﬁrewall and theoretical limit becomes larger. The local policy delay
becomes smaller as more ﬁrewalls are added; however, the gate delay remains constant, thus
more prominent in the total delay experienced.
5.6 Firewall Grids
The function parallel design described in the previous section seeks to provide lower packet
processing delay by distributing rules across an array of ﬁrewalls. In many cases, the function
parallel design provides lower delays than an equivalent data parallel design. This was shown
theoretically and experimentally using simulations in this report. However, the function
parallel design does not provide the best performance in all situations.
Given extremely high traﬃc loads, the data parallel design can perform better than an
equivalent function parallel system. Furthermore, the policy proﬁle (hit rate distribution)
has a signiﬁcant on performance, as seen in ﬁgure 21. Experiments performed assumed the
policy proﬁle followed an inverted Zipf distribution, where rules near the end of the policy had
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Figure 21: Average packet delay for the parallel design, each consisting of four ﬁrewalls, as the
arrival rate increases. Firewall policies consisted of 4096 rules and had either a Zipf or inverse
Zipf proﬁle.
higher probabilities of being the ﬁrst match. The function parallel design has an advantage
in this case because lower rules (the popular rules located near the end of the policy) are
evaluated earlier as compared to a data parallel design. However if more popular rules
appear near the beginning of the policy, the data parallel design performs better. Similarly,
the rule distribution eﬀects the performance of the function parallel system. As previously
described function parallel rule distribution (without gate) requires duplicating certain deny
rules. As the number of duplicate rules increases the performance decreases, as seen in ﬁgure
22. However, it is important to note function parallel still performs better when the number
of rules is doubled. Finally, function parallel does not perform better if rule processing can
be done in sub-linear time, since reducing the number of rules does not signiﬁcantly reduce
the processing time. This type of processing is possible with hardware ﬁrewalls, where static
rules can be eﬀectively represented using Ternary Content Addressable Memory (TCAM) or
a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) [29, 35].
Since neither parallel design always performs best, the best design uses a highly conﬁg-
urable array of ﬁrewalls. The array of ﬁrewalls can then change based on current traﬃc and
policy proﬁles. Function parallel design would be used when under low traﬃc loads or when
the policy proﬁle follows a Zipfs distribution. In addition, it is possible to provide a hybrid
function and data parallel design. The ﬁrewalls can be divided into a data parallel array
of function parallel groups. This design would combine high throughput and redundancy of
from the data parallel design and low processing delay from the function parallel design.
5.7 Parallel Intrusion Detection Systems
Although ﬁrewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) have some diﬀerences, they essen-
tially perform very similar operations. Both inspect and apply a policy to packets traversing
the system. Actions applied to packets include accept, deny, and, in the case of IDS, log-
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Figure 22: Average packet delay for the parallel designs, each consisting of four ﬁrewalls, as the
number of rules increases.
ging and generating alerts. When an alert is generated, it may request a rule change in the
ﬁrewall system to completely block the associated traﬃc. This connection between IDS and
the ﬁrewall creates an IPS. We will describe Snort IDS to better understand how IDS works
and to identify possible areas for parallelization.
Snort is a widely used, signature-based IDS, which consists of a packet decoding module,
preprocessing model, detection engine, and alert engine. The decoding module associates
a packet with a particular protocol. The preprocessor performs diﬀerent functions, such as
ﬂow detection, reassembly, and capturing the packet state for the IDS. These results are
given to the detection engine, which, like a ﬁrewall, applies a series of rules against the
packet stream.
An IDS rule expresses the action to perform on matching packets/streams and has a
format similar to that of a ﬁrewall rule. For example, consider the following Snort rule.
alert udp any any -> 10.1.1.0/24 222 (content:"|00 11 22 33 aa|"; msg:"rpcd request")
Each Snort rule consists of three components. The ﬁrst identiﬁes the action that must be
taken if there is a match. The second denotes the primary match criterion (similar to the 5
tuples from a ﬁrewall rule). In this example, the match criterion identiﬁes any TCP packet
destined for the 10.1.1.0/24 address space and port 222. The third component contains rule
options and describes any additional match criteria (for example, patterns in the payload)
and parameters for executing the action. In the example above, the Snort would search
for the hexadecimal pattern "00 11 22 33 aa" in the payload. If it is also a match, the
message "rpcd request" is generated. Therefore, Snort allows the speciﬁcation of packet
header and payload match criteria.
The processing time associated with intrusion detection can be signiﬁcant [4]. As both
the number of signatures and network line speeds continue to increase, it becomes even more
important to develop eﬃcient scalable approaches for IDS. In June 2003 there were just over
1500 signatures in the default Snort ruleset, in late 2006 there were more than 5000 default
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signatures. Even with current network speeds, an IDS processing traﬃc between two 100
Mbps networks must be able to process over 300,000 packets per second [40]. As High Speed
Networks (HSNs) such as the United States Department of Energy’s UltraScienceNet and
the Experimental Science Network that connect sites at 5 Gbps become more prevalent, the
need for more eﬃcient intrusion detection systems becomes more pressing.
Parallelism is one technique that may be used to help reduce IDS processing time. Par-
allelization can occur at diﬀerent levels of the intrusion detection system. For example the
entire IDS can be duplicated and arriving packets can be distributed to the various systems.
Likewise certain components comprising the system can be duplicated, such as the content
matching function. At each level either function parallelism (in which work is distributed)
or data parallelism (in which data is distributed) may be employed.
5.8 Implementation, Testing, and Collaborations
The project has also started network security collaboration with Deborah Frincke and Jon
McCoy from the DOE Paciﬁc Northwest National Laboratories (PNNL). During this summer
the PI will work at PNNL to integrate the optimization techniques and parallel designs
into the security infrastructure (PNNL currently utilizes a data parallel design). This is a
unique opportunity to apply this parallel ﬁrewall research to an actual high-speed network
environment.
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